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Abstract
Fiscal discipline is commonly evaluated on the basis of the debt-GDP ratio,
which exhibits a stock variable measured relative to a flow variable. This
way of monitoring debt solvency is arguably not consistent with transversal-
ity conditions obtained from optimizing macroeconomic frameworks. In this
paper we consider a wealth-based sustainability index of government debt
policy derived from a baseline endogenous growth model. We calculate the
index from 1999 onwards for countries in which the after-growth real interest
rate is positive, consistently with the theoretical setup. Results are radically
different from common wisdom. We show that the fiscal position is sustain-
able for both Germany and Italy, and strongly unsustainable for both Japan
and France. Policy implications of our findings are discussed.
JEL codes: E60, E62, H60. Keywords: Fiscal Discipline, Financial
Wealth, Sustainability Indicators.
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“Along with price stability, low unemployment and balanced growth, external and
public debt sustainability is an essential attribute of good macroeconomic policies.
Debt sustainability may be seen as a pre-condition of all the other attributes”.
Charles Wyplosz (2011, p. 27)
1 Introduction
The sustainability of fiscal policy is arguably one of the most debated issues
in current macroeconomics. Following the high debt levels experienced by
several developed economies since the early 1980s (see Azzimonti et al., 2014),
and especially in the aftermath of the 2007 global crisis, an intense concern
over the possible consequences for macroeconomic stability and economic
growth is periodically visible both in the academic literature and in the public
policy debate.
Fiscal discipline and the sustainability of public finances are commonly
evaluated by assessing the time path of the debt-GDP ratio, which displays
a stock variable measured relative to a flow variable. In the present paper
we argue that this measure is seriously flawed and may lead to wrong and
possibly harmful policy measures.
There are at least two major reasons why the debt-GDP ratio is a spurios
indicator: (i) it is not logically consistent to compare a stock relative to
a flow variable, although obvious relationships exist between the two; (ii)
the implied debt sustainability index is not theoretically consistent with the
transversality conditions obtained from dynamic optimizing macroeconomic
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frameworks, which instead pertain to the asymptotic behavior of pure stock
variables.
To illustrate these points clearly, we show, in the context of an endogenous
growth model, that forward-looking agents’ optimizing behavior typically
gives rise to a wealth-based sustainability index of government policy. We
are then able to calculate the resulting wealth-based indicator from 1999
onwards for countries which exhibit a positive after-growth real interest rate,
in line with asymptotic properties prevailing in growth theory.
Once private wealth is taken into account for an empirical evaluation of
the long-run fiscal balance, results appear to be fundamentally different from
common wisdom. In particular, we show that the fiscal position is sustainable
for both Germany and Italy, and strongly unsustainable for both Japan and
France. These findings are obscured if one concentrates on the dynamics of
the debt-GDP ratio.
The present paper is connected to a large body of empirical and theo-
retical literature. Sustainability indicators and tests of debt solvency relying
upon the time path of the debt-GDP ratio have been suggested by many au-
thors: see, e.g., Miller (1983), Buiter (1983, 1985, 1987), Blanchard (1990),
Horne (1991), Ize (1991), Buiter et al. (1993), Croce and Juan-Ramon (2003)
for empirical strategies based on indicators, and Hamilton and Flavin (1986),
Trehan and Walsh (1988), Bohn (1998, 2008) for strategies based on tests.1
Recently, analytical frameworks concerned with the sovereign debt sustain-
ability issue are in a voluminous literature dealing with the so-called “fiscal
1Literature reviews can be found in Balassone and Franco (2000), Larch and Nogueira
Martins (2007), and Marini and Piergallini (2008).
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space”, defined as the “room” in a government’s budget that allows it to
increase the deficit without jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial po-
sition (see, e.g., Heller, 2005; Ostry et al., 2010, 2015; Baldacci et al., 2011;
Bi and Leeper, 2013; Ghosh et al., 2013; Fournier and Fall, 2015). However,
no existing indicators are free of major inconsistencies stressed here. Excep-
tions are Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) and Aizeinman and Jinjarak (2010)
who came close to our approach. The first provides a dynamic indicator
based only on capital stock and not on total wealth; the second measures
the outstanding public debt relative to the de facto tax base or the tax-years
needed to repay the public debt.
In a different context (the environment), an analogous approach to our
own has also been suggested by Arrow et al. (2004), who refer to the net
worth of an entity (the government or the country) as a base for assessing
sustainability.
The policy implications of our findings are straightforward and relevant.
Specifically, fiscal rules such as those enshrined in the Fiscal Compact in
the European Union, prescribing a reduction of the difference between the
debt-GDP ratio and the 60 percent Maastricht reference value at an average
rate of one-twentieth per year, are misleading, for they abstract from the
evolution of households’ total wealth, which is relevant for fiscal solvency.
The sustainability results here obtained for both Germany and Italy are
instructive.
Overall, the analysis developed in this paper proposes an alternative per-
spective, largely overlooked by the fiscal policy literature and policy makers,
in order to assess the degree of fiscal discipline on the grounds of dynamic
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macroeconomic theory. It shows that incorporating agents’ wealth in the
formulation of budgetary policy indicators turns out to be essential to guar-
antee logical consistency in monitoring fiscal sustainability and implement
proper policy measures.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up an endogenous growth
model in the presence of the public sector. Section 3 lays out the optimality
conditions. Section 4 focuses on the balanced growth path and examines
the model’s properties. Section 5 derives the wealth-based fiscal indicator.
Section 6 applies the index to data, states the main sustainability results,
and discusses the related policy implications. Section 7 provides concluding
comments.
2 The Model
To elucidate our argument, consider a continuous-time macroeconomic envi-
ronment a` la Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), which allows fiscal policy to play
a key role on the long-run economic growth and the intertemporal aspect
of changes in the government’s budget balance to be addressed in a more
natural and convenient way.2 All variables are time dependent, though the
2These features are typical of a set of models notably collected under the heading of
endogenous growth models: see, e.g., Barro (1990), Jones and Manueli (1990), Rebelo
(1991), Jones et al. ( 1993), Pecorino (1993), Ireland (1994), and Turnovsky (1996, 2000).
An extra, worthy advantage of the above analytical framework is that it explicitly models
the public investment-growth relationship which the IMF-World Bank staff, following a
recurring criticism by many observers, now recognizes to be critical for a comprehensive
monitoring of debt sustainability over the long term. See, e.g., Wyplosz (2011), Buffie et
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time index is suppressed for notational convenience.
The representative household’s utility function is described by an in-
tertemporal isoelastic function of the form
U =
∫
∞
t
1
σ
(CGεC)
σ e−β(v−t)dv, ε > 0, −∞ < σ < 1, εσ < 1, 1 > σ (1 + ε) ,
(1)
where C = private consumption, GC = government spending on consumption
goods, ε = impact of government consumption on the welfare of private
agents, σ = parameter linked to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ξ
by ξ = 1/ (1− σ) (or σ = (ξ − 1) /ξ), and the constraints on the coefficients
are imposed to ensure conventional concavity properties.
The household faces the following budget constraint:
•
W ≡
•
K +
•
B = rB + (1− τ) Y − (1 + κ)C − T, (2)
whereW ≡ K+B = real wealth, K = private capital stock, B = government
bonds, r = real rate of interest, τ = (constant) tax rate on income, κ =
(constant) tax rate on consumption, T = lump-sum tax (transfer if negative)
playing the role of a “balancing item”.3
The production function is described by
Y = AGαIK
1−α = A
(
GI
K
)α
K, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (3)
where Y = output, GI = government spending on infrastructures, A = index
of technological knowledge.
al. (2012), and IMF (2012, 2014, 2016).
3Notice that, in order to take account of different tax rates on income and the interest
on bonds, we set the tax rate on r equal to 0, so that r is also the after-tax real interest
rate.
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The economy-wide resource constraint is
•
K = Y − C −G, (4)
where G ≡ Gc +GI .
The government budget constraint is
•
B = rB +G− τY − κC − T. (5)
3 Optimality Conditions
The household’s optimization problem is given by
max
∫
∞
t
1
σ
(CGεC)
σ e−β(v−t)dv
subject to
•
K +
•
B = rB + (1− τ )AGαIK
1−α − (1 + κ)C − T.
The Lagrangian for this problem is defined as
L =
1
σ
(CGεC)
σ e−β(v−t)
+λe−β(v−t)
[
rB + (1− τ )AGαIK
1−α − (1 + κ)C − T −
(
•
K +
•
B
)]
,
where λ is the marginal utility of wealth, and the conditions for an optimum
are
∂L
∂C
= 0 =⇒ (CGεC)
σ−1GεC = λ (1 + κ) ,
−
•
λ + βλ =
∂L
∂K
=⇒ −
•
λ
λ
+ β = A (1− α) (1− τ)
(
GI
K
)α
,
−
•
λ + βλ =
∂L
∂B
=⇒ −
•
λ
λ
+ β = r.
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Combining the last two equations, we can express these conditions as
(CGεC)
σ−1GεC = λ (1 + κ) , (6a)
r = A (1− α) (1− τ )
(
GI
K
)α
= β −
•
λ
λ
. (6b)
In addition, the transversality conditions
lim
v−→∞
λBe−β(v−t) = lim
v−→∞
λKe−β(v−t) = lim
v−→∞
λWe−β(v−t) = 0 (6c)
must hold.
Equations (6a) and (6b) are familiar. (6a) equates the marginal utility
of consumption to the tax-adjusted marginal utility of wealth; (6b) is the
Keynes-Ramsey consumption rule equating the rate of return on savings to
the rate of return on consumption.
Using (6b) and differentiating (6a) with respect to time yields the growth
relationship
(σ − 1)
•
C
C
+ (εσ)
•
GC
GC
= β − r; (7a)
the first equality of (6b) implies that the interest rate is given by
r = A (1− α) (1− τ )
(
GI
K
)α
. (7b)
Thus, a rise in (GI/K) increases the equilibrium rate of interest r. Finally,
using (7b), we can express the aggregate output as
Y =
[
r
(1− α) (1− τ)
]
K. (8)
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4 Balanced Growth
Assume that the government sets its expenditures as constant shares of out-
put, i.e., set
GC = γCY, GI = γIY, 0 < γC , γI < 1; (9)
in order to address the issue of long-run fiscal sustanability, assume also that
along the balanced growth path all real variables grow at the same constant
rate g. Thus,
•
Y
Y
=
•
K
K
=
•
B
B
=
•
W
W
=
•
C
C
=
•
GC
GC
=
•
GI
GI
≡ g. (10)
Combining (10) with (7a) shows that the equilibrium growth rate is given by
g =
r − β
1− σ (1 + ε)
. (11)
Also, using the aggregate production function and GI = γIY yields
GI
K
= (AγI)
( 11−α) ,
which, substituted in (7b), allows the interest rate to be rewritten as
r = A(1− α)(1− τ )(AγI)
( α1−α). (7b’)
Next, dividing (4) by K and using (8), we can rewrite the aggregate
resource constraint as
•
K
K
≡ g =
r (1− γC − γI)
(1− α)(1− τ )
−
C
K
,
whence
C
K
≡ ϕ =
r (1− γC − γI)
(1− α)(1− τ)
− g. (12)
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Finally, dividing (2) by W and using (8), and letting T be equal to zero for
simplicity,4 we can write the consumption- and capital-wealth ratio in the
form
K
W
≡ ω =
r − g
(1 + κ)ϕ−
rα
1− α
, (13a)
C
W
≡ η =
r
(
1 +
αω
1− α
)
− g
(1 + κ)
. (13b)
To understand the model’s properties, from (7b’), (11), (12) and (13)
the following (partial derivative) effects of fiscal changes on key economic
variables can be gathered immediately:5 an increase in the income tax rate,
τ , raises the consumption-capital ratio, ϕ, and reduce both the interest rate,
r, and the growth rate, g; an increase in the consumption tax, κ, reduces
the consumption- wealth ratio, η, and the capital-wealth ratio, ω, but do not
affect the the interest rate and the growth rate; an increase in the government
consumption ratio, γC , crowds out the consumption-capital ratio, reducing
ϕ, but has no effect on either the interest rate or the growth rate; finally, an
increase in the government spending ratio on infrastructure, γI , raises both
the interest rate and the growth rate.
4Being T a balancing item, this is only to simplify algebra. The value of T needed to
ensure the long-run sustainability of the government debt policy is given further on.
5These effects imply the assumption that the fiscal impulse is financed either by lump-
sum taxation or by issuing more debt.
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5 Long-run Sustainability of Fiscal Policy
To assess the long-run sustainability of fiscal policy, assume, for convenience,
that government bonds consist only of perpetuities, paying a coupon rate of
one unit. The value of this government bond is 1/r and the value of the
outstanding debt is B = b/r, where b is the number of outstanding bonds.
With r constant, this also implies
•
B =
(
•
b/r
)
.
Using (8), (9), and (12), rewrite now the government budget constraint
(5) as
•
b
r
= b+
[
γC + γI − τ
(1− α)(1− τ)
]
rK − κϕK − T. (5b’)
Next, integrate (5b’) over the range [t,∞), to obtain
∞∫
t
Tve
−r(v−t)dv =
bt
r
+
∞∫
t
{
r
[
γC + γI − τ
(1− α)(1− τ)
]
+
−κϕ}Kte
−(r−g)(v−t)dv. (14)
Equation (14) is the intertemporal budget constraint of the government, re-
quiring that the present value of government expenditures less tax receipts
on economic activity, that is, the present value of the primary budget deficit,
plus the current value of debt, must equal the present value of current and
future lump-sum tax payments. Solving (14) under the transversality con-
ditions (6c), and dividing through by the size of the current wealth leads
to
F ≡
∞∫
t
Tve
−r(v−t)
Wt
dv =
(bt/r)
Wt
+
r
[
γC + γI − τ
(1− α)(1− τ)
]
− κϕ
r − g
ω, (15)
where the transversality conditions imply
r > g, (16)
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to ensure that the integral in (14) is well defined.6
Equations (7b’), (11), (12), (13) and (15) fully describe the balanced
growth economy. (7b’), (11), (12), and (13) determine the state of the econ-
omy and its fiscal policy as described by the parameter set {τ ,κ, γC , γI});
(15) determines the present discounted value of T required for the govern-
ment to be intertemporally solvent.
Equation (15) is a key relationship of the model and provides a sensible
index to assess the intertemporal (or long-run) sustainability of a government
fiscal balance. It measures the present value of fiscal policy adjustment nec-
essary to ensure the long-run sustainability of government debt. Following
Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), we call F a sustainability index of fiscal policy.
Further comments are in order to better appreciate the efficacy of the
index F . First, observe that all values are derived relative to the current
size of wealth, differently from Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) where values
are expressed relative to private capital. Overall, this avoids the shortcom-
ing of the debt-GDP ratio, where a stock variable is measured relative to a
flow variable. Second, the right-hand side includes two (correctly normal-
ized) components. The first is the current stock of government debt. The
second is the present value of the primary budget deficit. Hence, the left-
hand side computes the value of fiscal policy adjustment (here assumed to
take the form of lump-sum taxes) required to warrant the viability of the
long-run fiscal balance as reflected by the two components in the right-hand
6Notice that condition (16) is the opposite of that arising in early, backward-loooking
models centered on the debt-GDP ratio. The reason is that the dynamics is here forward-
looking.
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side of (15). Finally, being based on endogenous growth model, the index
provides a “dynamic scoring” of government debt that takes into account the
intertemporal nature of fiscal policy and its impact on the growth rate and
other macroeconomic variables, and by which we can assess a country’s fiscal
position as follows. When F ≤ 0, fiscal policy is said to be sustainable; when
0 < F ≤ (bt/r)/Wt, fiscal policy is said to be weakly unsustainable; when
F > (bt/r)/Wt, fiscal policy is said to be strongly unsustainable.
An extra advantage of our sustainability index is that it does not imply
any threshold level for the debt, which is puzzling and highly questioned
in academic literature.7 Rather, it provides a well-defined measure of fis-
cal policy adjustments required to bring back the government balance on a
sustainable path. Obviously, we do not believe our index to solve the “impos-
sible mission” of determining exactly which debt is sustainable and which is
not (Wyplosz, 2011). Nonetheless, we think it fruitfully answers to the issue
of finding a “simple, transparent and standardized tool that can be easily
implementable to all countries”.8 It is a dynamic scoring of the government
fiscal balance that switches emphasis from levels to paths and computes how
much adjustment is required to converge to the stability path. It also im-
plies that the adjustment process need not necessarily occur immediately,
but better spanned over a longer planning horizon to avoid the deep reces-
sions resulting from huge fiscal contractions and the risk of possible devilish
dynamics driven by self-fulfilling expectations of debt non-sustainability.9 As
7See, e.g., Cordella et al. (2010), Wyplosz (2011), Panizza and Presbitero (2014),
Pescatori et al. (2014), Egert (2015), Schadler (2016), and Chudik et al. (2017).
8Wyplosz (2011, pp. 10-11).
9See, e.g., De Grauwe and Ji (2012), and Canofari et al. (2015).
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Wyplosz (2011) notes, sacrificing growth in the short and even in the long
run to imprecisely known risks concerning a particular debt ceiling can be
very costly to any country. Indeed, in the presence of multiple equilibria
and self-fulfilling dynamics of debt (un-)sustainability, a fully solvent gov-
ernment with a high level of debt might be moved to implement restrictive
fiscal policies to reduce the supposed risks that a change in investors’ sen-
timents would push the country towards the bad equilibrium. Yet, these
policies may be very harmful and self-defeating, as they reduce growth and
increase the debt-to-GDP ratio especially if implemented during a recession
(DeLong and Summers, 2012; Cafiso and Cellini, 2014; House et al., 2017).
6 Empirical Results
We now calculate the index given by (15) for the post-1999 period, focusing
on countries in which the after-growth real interest rate is positive, consis-
tently with (16).
We obtained annual fiscal and growth data from the IMFWorld Economic
Outlook. We obtained the nominal interest rate series by dividing interest
payments for period t over the stock of nominal debt at the end of period t−1,
consistently with Bohn (2008). This enables us to take into account the fact
that government debt is composed of a portfolio of securities with different
interest rates. We obtained annual data for households’ net total wealth
from the OECD, that are available up to 2013. Therefore, since budgetary
forecasts contained in the IMF World Economic Outlook are available up
to 2021, the computation of the sustainability index uses averages of fiscal
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Figure 1: The Wealth-based Sustainability Indicator, 1999-2013
variables over nine years.10
Figure 1 shows the behavior of our wealth-based fiscal indicator for Ger-
many, Italy, France and Japan. The United States is not included because it
displays a negative after-growth real interest rate as an average over the sam-
ple. This observation is consistent with the results shown by Bohn (2008),
according to which a sufficiently high “growth dividend” ensures the sustain-
ability of U.S. fiscal policy. The same pattern is observed, remarkably, for
the remaining G7 countries, that is, the United Kingdom and Canada.
10Details on data and computations are given in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: The Government Debt-Wealth Ratio, 1999-2013
According to Figure 1, the path of the fiscal indicator for Germany and
Italy is sustainable, because the index converges to a value F ≤ 0. In this
case, primary surpluses along the balanced growth path are sufficient to
finance the outstanding debt-wealth ratio. The path for France and Japan
is unsustainable, because the index systematically displays a value F > 0.
In this case, fiscal parameters per se do not guarantee the intertemporal
viability of the government’s budget.
In particular, comparing Figure 1 with Figure 2, showing the behavior of
the government debt-wealth ratio, it emerges F > (bt/r)/Wt for both Japan
and France. This denotes that the governments in these two countries are
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running primary deficits, which further worsen their initial fiscal position.
Thus, from the foregoing perspective, we are led to conclude that the long-
run fiscal policy of France and Japan is “strongly” unsustainable.
The above results are very different from conventional views and signal
that indicators and tests of government solvency, used in the current fiscal
policy literature, are strongly biased and misleading and may lead to wrong
and perverse policy strategies. The case of Italy to which unnecessary fiscal
restrictions and, hence, undue worsening off effects on output and growth
are imposed according to the debt/GDP ratio and the Stability and Growth
Pact, is markedly instructive.
7 Conclusions
The evolution of public debt and deficits in OECD countries requires an
appropriate monitoring. In academic and public policy debates, the sustain-
ability of fiscal policy is periodically assessed on the basis of the debt-GDP
ratio, whereby a stock variable is measured relative to a flow variable. This
is logically and theoretically inconsistent if one refers to dynamic macroe-
conomic theory, whereby forward-looking agents’ optimization incorporates
transversality conditions ruling out explosive paths in pure state variables.
A typical endogenous growth optimizing model indeed leads to a sustainabil-
ity index of government policy that is wealth-based. Applying the index to
post-1999 data for countries that exhibit a positive after-growth real interest
rate yields sustainability results which significantly diverge from conventional
views. Specifically, fiscal policy is found to be sustainable for both Germany
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and Italy, and strongly unsustainable for both Japan and France. This sig-
nals that indicators and tests of government solvency, used in the current
fiscal policy literature, are distorted because they exclude the debt-wealth
ratio from the analysis, in sharp contrast with the theoretical predictions of
optimizing macroeconomic frameworks, and may lead to undue and perverse
policy strategies. Fiscal rules of the type enshrined in the Fiscal Compact in
the European Union, according to which member states shall reduce the dif-
ference between the debt-GDP ratio and the 60 percent Maastricht reference
value at an average rate of one-twentieth per year, are misleading, because
they disregard the time path of households’ total wealth, which is crucial to
assess the degree of sustainability. The case of Italy to which undue fiscal
restrictions are imposed according to the debt-GDP ratio and the Stability
and Growth Pact is decidedly instructive.
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Data Appendix
Sample data cover the G7 countries: United States, United Kingdom, Canada,
Germany, France, Italy and Japan.
Variable Description Source Sample period
Government debt Stock of general government gross debt IMF: World Economic
Outlook
1999-2013
Total budget General government revenue minus total
expenditure
IMF: World Economic
Outlook
1999-2021
Primary budget Total budget plus interest expense mi-
nus interest revenue
IMF: World Economic
Outlook
1999-2021
Present value of primary
budget
Average primary budget over nine years
period
Own Calculation 1999-2013
Interest payments Differential between primary and total
budget
Own Calculation 1999-2015
Implied interest rate Interest for period t over the government
debt stock at time t-1
Own Calculations 1999-2015
Gross domestic product Gross domestic product at current
prices
IMF: World Economic
Outlook
1999-2015
Net financial wealth Households’ financial assets minus fi-
nancial liabilities
OECD: Dataset 720 1999-2013
Real wealth Households’ non financial assets OECD: Dataset 9B11 1999-2013
After growth interest rate Average imp. interest rate minus aver-
age nom. growth rate
Own Calculations 1999-2015
Net total wealth Real wealth plus net financial wealth Own calculation 1999-2013
11The source for Italy is Banca d’Italia, “La ricchezza delle famiglie italiane 2014”.
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